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This study investigated whether demographic variables, efficacy beliefs, visions and 
worries are associated with four different forms of (dis)engagement with the European Union: 
intended voting in the 2019 EU elections, non-conventional political engagement, 
psychological engagement, and the wish that one’s own country should leave the EU. The 
sample comprised 3.764 young people aged 16 to 25 years living in seven European 
countries: Albania, Austria, Germany, Italy, Romania, Spain and UK. Economic challenges, 
human rights and the environment were the most important future visions; unemployment and 
poverty, climate change, civil unrests and the collapse of the EU were the most important 
future worries. The four forms of (dis)engagement with the European Union were 
differentially associated with predictors, although internal efficacy and future vision of 
economic challenges predicted all forms. Implications for future EU policy are discussed. 
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Young People’s Engagement with the European Union: The Importance of 
Visions and Worries for the Future of Europe 
The European Union (EU) has recently faced several fundamental challenges that have 
put the question of the future of the European project on the political agenda. There is no 
doubt that today’s young people will shape the future of Europe in the long run – but are their 
voices being heard today? What visions and worries do young people have for the future of 
Europe? Do young people think they can influence political decisions on the European level? 
Do young people’s efficacy beliefs, visions and worries translate into engagement with the 
EU? 
The Europe 2038 project1 was designed to answer these questions, and a large scale 
PAN-European survey was conducted with youth aged 16 to 25 years. To maximise the 
generalizability of the findings, seven European countries with differing relationships to the 
EU participated in this project.2  
Why Young People’s Voices are Important 
Political decision-making on a supranational level like the EU is more complex and 
distant from young people’s everyday lives than politics on a local level such as 
neighbourhoods or cities (Barrett & Zani, 2015b; Serek, Lacinova & Macek, 2012). This is 
especially true for high stakes decisions (like Brexit) that might have an unforeseeable impact 
on the future of many people. There are different ways that youth can engage with 
supranational entities like the EU (Zani & Barrett, 2012), including conventional political 
participation (e.g., voting in EU elections), non-conventional political participation (e.g., 
signing petitions to try and influence European institutions, processes or decision-making), 
 
1 The Europe 2038 project is a multinational research project funded by the Europe for Citizens programme 
2014-2020; Strand2: Democratic engagement and civic participation; Action 2.3: Civil society projects; call 
2015, project ID 564710. For more info see: http://www.europe2038.eu/  
2 The present study comprises two founding member states (Germany and Italy), three countries that joined 1986 
(Spain), 1995 (Austria) and 2007 (Romania), one candidate country (Albania), and one country that decided to 
leave the European Union in 2016 (the UK). 
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and psychological engagement with the EU (e.g., following the news about European issues 
or discussing European topics with friends). Young people might also be disengaged, wanting 
their country to leave the EU. This type of disengagement has been conceptualized as a form 
of disidentification (Becker & Tausch, 2014), and called “exit” in a recent study (Prodromitis, 
Chryssochoou & Papastamou, 2017). These four different forms of supranational 
(dis)engagement are expressions of young people’s wish to shape the future of Europe either 
in the public or private sphere (Amnå & Ekman, 2015) or by individual or collective actions 
(Amnå, 2012; Ekman & Amnå, 2012). Listening to young people’s voices and understanding 
the factors associated with different forms of supranational (dis)engagement is also important 
given the imbalance of power and control in favour of older groups (Albanesi, Mazzoni, 
Cicognani, & Zani, 2015). 
Understanding Young People’s Engagement with the EU 
To the best of our knowledge, no study to date has investigated these four different 
forms of young people’s (dis)engagement with the EU and no conceptual model has been 
developed to understand young people’s engagement on a supranational political level. 
However, Cicognani and Zani (2015) proposed a psychosocial model of participation, 
identifying seven factors associated with engagement and participation: (1) personal and 
demographic, (2) social construction of participation, (3) motivations and goals, (4) emotions, 
(5) social identities and sense of belonging, (6) perceived power and influence, and (7) 
perceived opportunities and barriers. Barrett (2015) also constructed an integrative model of 
political and civic participation, identifying different factors associated with three forms of 
engagement (i.e., voting, volunteering, and collective action). Thus, to develop the conceptual 
model for the present study (see Table 1), three sets of factors were taken from the Cicognani 
and Zani (2015) model; these were expected to predict the four forms of supranational 
(dis)engagement differently, based on the theorizing of Barrett (2015). 
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Demographic variables (gender, age and immigrant status) were included in the 
model. Cicognani, Zani, Fournier, Gavray and Born (2012) found that men aged 15 to 19 
showed higher political interest and internet political participation than women, but they did 
not find gender differences regarding voting intentions. Eckstein, Noak and Gniewosz (2012) 
did not find gender differences regarding political engagement among adolescents attending 
school grades 7 to 11, but demonstrated that longitudinal trajectories differed depending on 
academic vs. vocational school track. Civic and political engagement increase between late 
adolescence and early adulthood (e.g., Albanesi et al., 2015). For immigrants, opportunity 
structures for conventional political engagement are usually constrained, because they are 
often not citizens in their country of residence even if they were born there (Montgomery, 
2015). However, Barrett and Zani (2015) argue that immigrants do have alternative 
possibilities for engagement even if they have no right to vote in their country of residence. 
And indeed, immigrants in Italy from Morocco and Albania display higher levels of civic 
participation compared to their non-immigrant Italian peers (Albanesi et al., 2015), and higher 
levels of political attentiveness and political participation (excluding voting) are found among 
Turkish and Moroccan immigrant youth in Belgium than in non-immigrant Belgian youth 
(Gavray, Born & Fournier, 2015). 
Goals were conceptualized as visions and worries for the long-term future of Europe 
instead of investigating personal goals as typically done in the literature (Cicognani & Zani, 
2015). Because of the novelty of this study, it was necessary to develop a comprehensive and 
meaningful list of visions and worries. 
Perceived power and influence were operationalized in terms of internal, external and 
collective political efficacy. While internal political efficacy was defined as feeling 
knowledgeable and competent regarding EU issues, external political efficacy was defined as 
the belief that one’s voice is heard and taken seriously by decision-makers at the European 
level (Caprara, Vecchione, Capanna & Mebane, 2009). Collective political efficacy (Bandura, 
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2000) was defined as the belief that young people as a group can successfully impact the 
future of Europe and political decisions on the European level. Although previous studies 
have revealed the importance of all three efficacy beliefs, internal efficacy tends to be the 
most consistent predictor of political and civic participation (Barrett, 2015; Brunton-Smith & 
Barrett, 2015).  
Research Questions 
Data were collected in seven European countries from youth aged 16 to 25 years to 
answer the following three research questions (RQ):  
RQ 1: What visions and worries do youth living in seven European countries have for 
the long-term future of Europe? 
Because youths’ long-term future visions and worries for Europe have never been 
investigated systematically before, it was necessary (1) to develop a comprehensive list of 
relevant topics and (2) to establish the factor structure of the new instrument. 
RQ 2: Are there differences in visions and worries, engagement with the EU and 
efficacy beliefs depending on gender, age and immigrant status? 
To investigate age differences between late adolescents and emerging adults, the youth 
were divided into two groups: 16-19 year olds and 20-25 year olds. The cut-off age of 19 was 
used because this is the average age of university entrance in most of the participating 
countries. Young people were categorized as first generation immigrants when their country 
of birth did not match their country of residence. It was hypothesized that age and gender are 
associated with the different forms of engagement with the EU, because of already 
documented differences in studies on general political engagement (Albanesi et al., 2015; 
Cicognani et al., 2012). Because of the novelty of the present study, we did not formulate 
hypotheses regarding visions, worries and efficacy beliefs. 
RQ3: Do demographic variables, visions and worries and efficacy beliefs predict the 
four forms of engagement with the EU differently? 
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We hypothesized that demographic variables, efficacy beliefs, visions and worries 
would predict different forms of engagement for the EU differentially (Barrett, 2015). As the 
data collection took place between April and December 2016, it was possible to split the 
sample into data collected before and after the Brexit referendum (June 23, 2016) and to 
control for this macro-level event in the analyses. 
Method 
Study Design 
As a first step, a qualitative pre-study was conducted with a minimum of five young 
persons aged 16 to 25 years in each of the seven European countries that were members of the 
Europe 2038 project3. The main goal was to generate as many visions and worries for the 
future of Europe as possible. The interview guideline consisted of three parts: 1) Short and 
long-term personal future: hopes and fears, visions and worries; 2) short and long-term future 
of Europe: hopes and fears, visions and worries; 3) the relation between the personal future 
and the future of Europe. To capture spontaneous associations, the first interview questions 
were formulated very broadly and followed by prompts, e.g., How do you envision the future 
of Europe in 25 years? Where do you see challenges? Where do you see benefits? The 
interviews were conducted in different languages, transcribed and content analysed by the 
seven country teams. The visions and worries resulting from the country-specific content 
analyses were back-translated into English. A multi-national sub-team constructed a 
preliminary list of visions and worries for the future of Europe. The other project members 
who were not part of this sub-team reviewed this preliminary list, clarified unclear items and 
deleted redundant items. This procedure resulted in a list of 39 future visions and 31 future 
worries that were integrated in the quantitative survey. 
 
3For more details see: http://www.europe2038.eu/survey/pre-study/ 
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As a second step, a quantitative online survey was conducted. Beside the newly 
developed list of visions and worries for the future of Europe, three multi-national sub-teams 
selected well-established scales to measure several additional constructs of interest. All 
selected scales, which were in English, were again reviewed by the other project members to 
shorten the final survey. The final survey was translated into six languages (in two countries 
the language was German) and back-translated by two independent bi-lingual team members. 
The final versions of the survey were available online between April/July (depending on 
country) and December 20164. 
Procedure 
All necessary permits to conduct the study were obtained from local and national 
bodies and ethical committees of the project teams’ universities. The goal was to collect data 
from a minimum of 250 young persons per country, equally divided by gender and age group 
(16-19 vs. 20-25 years). The sample was intended to ideally match other relevant national 
characteristics like educational background or immigrant status. Participants were recruited by 
advertising the online survey on several relevant national webpages, sending the link to 
teachers, social workers and other professionals, advertising in newspapers, local radio 
stations, television, and during national events. Moreover, in Austria, Italy and the UK, data 
were also collected in schools. 
Measures 
Demographic information. Information regarding gender, age, citizenship, country of 
birth, and country of residence was obtained. Participants were asked what best describes 
what they are currently doing: studying at school, studying at (tech) college or university, 
looking for a job, working full time, working part time, being in an apprenticeship or training 
 
4For more details see: http://www.europe2038.eu/survey/online-survey/ 
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scheme, not being in work or training or education, caring for a child or dependent, waiting 
for the processing of the asylum application, other. 
Visions for Europe 2038. To assess future visions, the following instruction was 
given: Imagine that you are the head of the European Union and you could set priorities for 
Europe 2038. Which topics are the most important? Please also mark your top 5 priorities. 
The 39 visions were rated on a 5-point scale ranging from very important (5) to not at 
all important (1) (see Results section for items). 
Worries about Europe 2038. To assess future worries, the following instruction was 
given: Imagine yourself in 2038, which of the following things are you worried about? Please 
also indicate for each topic whether this is one of your top 5 worries. The 31 worries were 
rated on a 5 point scale ranging from a lot (5) to not at all (1) (see Results section for items). 
Engagement with the EU. Conventional political engagement was measured with one 
item “Will you vote in the European Union elections in 2019?” This item was not part of the 
survey in Albania and the UK, as Albania is currently a candidate country and data collection 
in the UK started after the Brexit referendum. Non-conventional political engagement was 
measured with six items (e.g. “Have you ever signed a petition about an issue regarding the 
European Union?”). Psychological engagement was measured with three items (e.g. “Do you 
follow news about the European Union on TV, the radio, or in newspapers?”). These items 
were inspired by the PIDOP project (Barrett & Zani, 2015a). Disengagement from the EU 
was measured with one item “Do you think your country should remain in the European 
Union?” Again, this item was not part of the survey in Albania and was not used for the UK 
in the present analyses. The answer format of all items was yes or no. 
Efficacy Beliefs. Internal Efficacy was measured with three items (e.g. “I know more 
about European issues than most people of my age”). Collective Efficacy was measured with 
three items (e.g. “By working together young people can successfully influence the future of 
Europe”). External Efficacy was measured with three items (e.g. “The European Union is 
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doing its best to find out about what young people in Europe want”). These items were 
inspired by the PIDOP project (Barrett & Zani, 2015a) and were answered on a 5-point rating 
scale ranging from strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1).  
All items were presented randomly for each participant to avoid ordering effects. 
Participants 
After data cleaning, data of 3.764 young people aged 16 to 25 years were analysed. 
Demographic characteristics are reported in Table 2. 2.361 participants were 16 to 19 years 
old and 1.403 were 20 to 25 years old. 1.499 were men and 2.252 were women. The sample 
size in the seven countries varied between 176 (Albania) and 1.385 (Austria). Unfortunately, 
it was not possible to collect representative data, with all demographic variables differing 
between the seven countries and for the two age groups. It is important to understand that 
differences between countries also reflect differences in educational systems. In Austria and 
Germany, a high proportion of 16-19-year-olds are in apprenticeship or training, while in the 
UK and Spain many attend college (instead of school). 45.9% of data was collected pre-Brexit 
and 54.9% post-Brexit, and this variable was included in analyses. 
Statistical Analyses 
All measures were first tested for construct validity using SPSS. For each construct, 
we conducted a principal component analysis with oblique rotation. For factor extraction, we 
used the Eigenvalue > 1 criterion to find the best interpretable solution. Further, we used 
Parallel Analysis based on minimum rank factor analysis (Timmerman & Lorenzo-Seva, 
2011) in R (package psych). To establish cross-country factorial invariance was not 
necessary, as we did not perform cross-national comparisons. Thus, data of the whole sample 
was used. 
Univariate analyses were then conducted to investigate whether the demographic 
variables (gender, age, immigrant status) moderated the levels of visions, worries, 
engagement with the EU and efficacy beliefs.  
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Finally, for each of the four engagement variables, block-wise (binary logistic) 
regression models were conducted. Block 1 contained the demographic variables. Block 2 
contained the efficacy variables. Block 3 contained the visions for Europe 2038. Block 4 
contained the worries for Europe 2038. 
Results 
Construct Validity of the Measures 
Visions for Europe 2038. Eight factors emerged with an Eigenvalue > 1.00. Parallel 
analyses also suggested eight factors. The 8-factor structure was theoretically meaningful and 
explained 53.12% of the variance. There were no double loadings > 0.40 but eight items with 
loadings < 0.40 were excluded (art & design, urban development, globalization, freedom, 
health care, rural development, education, data security). Moreover, based on subsequent 
reliability analyses, three more three items were excluded (religion, European army, increase 
number of EU member states). The final eight scales (28 items) that were internally consistent 
(Cronbach’s alpha) were the following: Technology (technology, digitalization, 
communication & media, mobility, 4 items α=0.74). Human Rights (human rights, women’s 
rights, LGBTQIA’s rights, children’s rights, inclusion of person with special needs, 5 items, 
α=0.76). Reduction of the EU (decrease in the number of member states, return power to 
national governments, 2 items, α=0.62; r=0.45, p<0.001). Migration (immigration, refugees, 2 
items, α=0.69, r=0.52, p<0.001). Economic Challenges (financial crisis, economy, security, 
unemployment, 4 items, α=0.67). Social cohesion (retirement & pensions, family policies, 
ageing, social cohesion, social welfare, 5 items α=0.68). Environment (environment, energy, 
nutrition, natural resources, 4 items, α=0.67). EU policy (EU policy, increase the power of the 
European parliament, 2 items, α=0.59, r=0.43, p<0.001). 
Worries about Europe 2038. Six factors emerged with an Eigenvalue > 1.00. 
Parallel analyses also suggested six factors. The 6-factor structure was theoretically 
meaningful and explained 57.07% of the variance. One item (prejudice, discrimination and 
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racism) had double loadings > 0.40 on two factors and two items had a loading < 0.40 and 
were excluded (countries going bankrupt, militarization at the European boarders). The 
final six scales (28 items) all were internally consistent and were the following: 
Unemployment and Poverty (unemployment, poverty, gap between the rich and the poor, 
injustice, price rises, shortages of social services in Europe, corruption, 7 items, α=0.81). 
Civil Unrests and Collapse of EU (religious and/or ethnic conflicts, war outside of Europe, 
rise of extreme right-wing parties, less solidarity in Europe, nationalism in Europe, civil 
unrest, collapse of the EU, restrictions and violence at the European boarders, 8 items, 
α=0.82). State Surveillances and Repressions (rise of state surveillance, state repression, 2 
items, α=0.62, r = 0.36, p<0.001). Influx of Migrants (influxes of migrants and refugees, 
rise of extreme left-wing parties, α=0.52, 2 items, r = 0.37, p<0.001). Diseases and 
Violence (increase in diseases, unexpected disease epidemics, war in Europe, terrorism, 
violence and crime, sexual violence, dictatorship, 7 items, α=0.84). Climate Change 
(climate change, environmental or natural disasters, 2 items, α=0.62, r = 0.46, p<0.001). 
Engagement for the EU. A principal component analysis with oblique rotation with 
two fixed factors confirmed the 2-factor structure of the scale. The two emerging factors were 
theoretically meaningful, explained 45.77% of the variance, and coincided with the two 
subscales psychological engagement, (3 items, α=0.55) and non-conventional political 
engagement (6 items, α=0.66). 
Efficacy Beliefs. A principal component analysis with oblique rotation with three fixed 
factors was conducted for the nine items assessing efficacy. The 3-factor structure was 
interpretable and theoretically meaningful and explained 62.55% of the variance. Two 
recoded items had factor loadings < 0.40 and low reliabilities and were excluded from further 
analyses. Thus, internal efficacy (α=0.72, r=0.57, p<0.001) and external efficacy (α=0.75, 
r=0.60, p<0.001) consisted of two items. Collective efficacy consisted of three items 
(α=0.82). 
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Visions and Worries for the Future of Europe (RQ1) 
As shown in Table 3, gender and age differences (16-19 vs. 20-25 years) regarding the 
eight visions and six worries emerged. Few differences based on immigrant status were found. 
Visions for Europe 2038. Women rated human rights, migration, economy and social 
cohesion as more important than men, who rated technology and the reduction of the EU 
more important than did women. Sixteen to 19-year-olds rated technology, human rights, 
reduction of the EU, economy, and EU policy more important than 20- to 25-year-olds, who 
rated migration and social cohesion as more important than younger youths. First generation 
immigrants (M=4.22, SD=0.61) rated economy as less important than did non-immigrants 
(M=4.30, SD=0.59, t(3133)=2.29, p=0.02, d=0.15). 
Worries about Europe 2038. Except for migration where there were no gender 
differences, women worried more than men. Sixteen to 19-year-olds were more worried about 
migration, diseases and violence compared with 20- to 25-year-olds who were more worried 
about civil unrests and the collapse of the EU. First generation immigrants (M=2.99, 
SD=1.05) worried less about the influx of migrants compared to non-immigrants (M=3.22, 
SD=1.05, t(3383)=3.55, p<0.01, d=0.23). They (M=3.21, SD=0.76) also worried less about 
diseases and violence compared to non-immigrants (M=3.37, SD=0.72, t(3289)=3.46, p<0.01, 
d=0.22). 
Engagement with the EU and Efficacy Beliefs (RQ2) 
As shown in Table 4, several gender and age differences (16-19 vs. 20-25 years) 
emerged; few differences based on immigrant status were found. 
Engagement with the EU. Fewer men than women intended to vote in the 2019 EU 
election, but more men than women wanted their country to leave the EU. Men also indicated 
higher non-conventional participation with the EU than did women. Twenty to 25-year-olds 
indicated higher levels of non-conventional political and psychological engagement than 16- 
to 19-year-olds, who were more in favour of their country leaving the EU compared to 20-to 
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25-year-olds. Fewer first generation immigrants (87.8%) intended to vote in the 2019 election 
compared to non-immigrants (92.5%), χ²(1)=5.34, p<0.01). However, first generation 
immigrants (M=1.39, SD=1.47) indicated a higher level of non-conventional participatory 
behaviour than non-immigrants (M=1.19, SD=1.42; t(3176)=2.04, p=0.04, d=0.14). 
Efficacy Beliefs. Men had higher internal and external efficacy beliefs than women 
who had higher collective efficacy beliefs than men. Sixteen to 19-year-olds had higher levels 
of collective and external efficacy beliefs than 20- to 25-year-olds. No differences depending 
on immigrant status were found. 
Prediction of Engagement with the EU (RQ3) 
The results of the final model (including all four blocks) are presented in Table 5. The 
explained variance for intended voting was 5.8% but ranged between 16.5 and 20.5% for the 
other forms of engagement. 
Intended Voting for the 2019 EU Elections. Block-wise binary logistic regression 
models were conducted. The block 1 variables explained less than 1%, adding block 2 
variables explained 2.8%, adding block 3 variables explained 5.4% and adding block 4 
variables explained 5.8% of the variance. Young people who intended to vote in the next EU 
election took part in the study before Brexit, were more often women, had higher levels of 
knowledge about the EU (i.e. higher internal efficacy), prioritized economic challenges more, 
but the reduction of the EU less. They were more worried about civil unrest and the collapse 
of the EU.  
Non-Conventional Political Engagement. Block-wise linear regression models 
were conducted. The block 1 variables explained 5.1%, adding block 2 variables explained 
18.2%, adding block 3 variables explained 19.6% and adding block 4 variables explained 
20.5% of the variance. Young people with higher levels of non-conventional political 
participation took part in the study after Brexit, were more likely to be 20- to 25-year-olds, 
had higher levels of knowledge about the EU, but prioritized economic challenges less than 
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those with lower levels of non-conventional political participation. Moreover, they were 
less worried about disease and violence, but more worried about state surveillance and 
repression. 
Psychological Engagement with EU Issues. Block-wise linear regression models 
were conducted. The block 1 variables explained 4.2%, adding block 2 variables explained 
14.7%, adding block 3 variables explained 19.1% and adding block 4 variables explained 
20.1% of the variance. Young people with higher levels of psychological engagement were 
more likely to be 20- to 25-year-olds. They had higher levels of knowledge about the EU 
(i.e. higher internal efficacy), but perceived lower levels of interest by the EU in young 
people’s voice (i.e. lower external efficacy). They prioritized the reduction of the EU less, 
but the visions of economic challenges and migration more. They were more worried about 
civil unrests and the collapse of the EU and were less worried about disease and violence. 
Own Country should leave the EU. Block-wise binary logistic regression models 
were conducted. The block 1 variables explained 1.6%, adding block 2 variables explained 
4.9%, adding block 3 variables explained 13.6% and adding block 4 variables explained 
16.5% of the variance. Young people who wanted their own country to leave the EU were 
more likely to participate in the study before Brexit, were more often men than women, had 
higher levels of knowledge about the EU, but perceived lower levels of interest by the EU in 
young people’s voice, prioritized the reduction of the EU more, but economic challenges and 
EU policy less. Furthermore, they worried more about unemployment, poverty and the influx 
of migrants but less about civil unrest and EU collapse. 
Discussion 
The main goals of the present study were (1) to find out which long-term visions and 
worries young people had for the future of Europe, and (2) to investigate whether 
demographic variables, visions, worries and efficacy beliefs were associated with engagement 
with the EU.  
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Young People’s Visions and Worries for the Future of Europe 
Economic challenges, human rights and environment emerged as the most important 
long-term future visions, while unemployment and poverty, climate change, civil unrests and 
the collapse of the EU were youth’s most important long-term future worries. There was a 
gender gap for human rights, indicating that this topic was more important for women. 
Overall, women worried more about the future of Europe compared to men as indicated in 
their higher levels in five out of six worry scales. This finding might be explained by gender 
differences in anxiety levels of women compared to men (Duchesne & Ratelle, 2016). 
Interestingly, 16- to 19-year-olds scored higher in six out of eight vision scales compared to 
20- to 25-year-olds. It is possible that the older youths are more realistic about how difficult it 
is to realize visions, and were therefore more cautious. Environment was an equally important 
vision for both age groups, but civil unrest and the collapse of the EU were more worrisome 
for the 20- to 25-year-olds. It is possible that older youths are more aware of the possible 
consequences of a collapse of the EU compared with younger ones who might take the 
existence of the EU for granted. First generation immigrants prioritized economic challenges 
less and worried less about the influx of migrants and uncontrollable events compared to their 
non-immigrant peers. These results make sense as first generation immigrants are more aware 
of the positive sides of immigration compared to their non-immigrant peers. Moreover, they 
might have already coped with many challenges during migration and therefore might worry 
less about disease and violence. 
Levels of Young People’s Engagement with the EU 
When looking at the young people’s engagement, an interesting pattern emerged. The 
levels of intended voting and psychological engagement were relatively high, while the levels 
of non-conventional political engagement and the wish that one’s own country should leave 
the EU were relatively low. In line with the existing literature (Cicognani et al., 2012), men 
had higher levels of non-conventional political participation with the EU than women. 
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However, men had lower levels of intended voting in the next EU elections and wanted their 
country to leave the EU more. We found that, compared to women, men prioritized the 
reduction of the EU as a future vision for Europe more, and were more disengaged from the 
EU (see Barrett, 2015). Our analyses revealed that 16- to 19-year-olds had lower levels of 
psychological and non-conventional political engagement but wanted their country to leave 
the EU more than 20- to 25-year-olds. Although there were no age differences regarding 
intended voting, overall 16- to 19-year-olds were more disengaged from the EU than older 
youths. It is possible that younger people had fewer possibilities to engage, as schools often 
do not foster political and civic engagement (Eckstein et al., 2015). Consistent with their 
constraint opportunities as non-EU citizens and with existing studies (Albanesi et al., 2015; 
Gavray et al., 2015; Montgomery, 2015), first generation immigrants had lower levels of 
intended voting in the next EU elections, but higher levels of non-conventional political 
engagement with the EU.  
Prediction of Young People’s Engagement with the EU 
According to the theorizing of Barrett (2015) and our conceptual model, the four 
different forms of engagement with the EU were predicted differently by demographic 
variables, visions, worries and efficacy beliefs. Although several visions and worries were 
predictive for all forms of engagement, our data show that future visions are especially 
important to better understand conventional political participation and why young people 
want their country to leave the EU. 
Young people who wanted their own country to leave the EU are probably the most 
interesting group. It is possible that these individuals faced several strains in their lives (e.g., 
unemployment), and were therefore unable to recognize possible benefits of the EU for 
themselves or for their country.  
Our findings also show that macro-level events like the Brexit referendum are 
associated with the political engagement of young people and that these effects might work 
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differently for conventional and non-conventional political engagement. For non-conventional 
and psychological engagement, internal efficacy (i.e., knowledge about EU) was the strongest 
predictor indicating that the perceived level of knowledge is important for young people to get 
active. It is likely that young people who take actions, worry less about disease and violence 
that might happen in the future (Bandura, 2000). 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to collect longitudinal representative data. Instead, a 
convenience concurrent sample answered an online-survey resulting in different sample sizes 
and uneven distributions of all demographic variables. Because the results would be very 
difficult to interpret, we decided to not perform country-level comparisons. Moreover, some 
scales had rather low internal consistencies and should therefore be interpreted with caution. 
Future studies might enlarge the scope of the theoretical model by including more 
variables at different levels of analysis (Cicognani & Zani, 2015). Moreover, to apply person-
centred statistical analyses is highly recommended in future studies to discover differently 
engaged groups of young people (Amnå & Ekman, 2015). 
The present study clearly indicates that the EU needs to listen to the voices of young 
people, who articulated important visions for the future of Europe. Overall, to combine a 
strong economy with human rights and environment should be fostered by EU decision-
makers even more in the future.  
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Conceptual Model of the Present Study 
Sets of Predictors Forms of Engagement with the EU 
Macro-Level 
Data collected before or after Brexit 




Age group (16-19 years vs. 20-25 
years) 
First generation immigrant status 
 
1. Intended voting for the 2019 
EU election 
2. Non-conventional political 
participation for EU issues 
Goals 
Visions for Europe 2038 
Worries for Europe 2038 
3. Psychological engagement with 
EU issues 
4. Own country should leave the 
EU 
Power and Influence 
Knowledge about the EU (i.e., internal 
efficacy) 
Perceived interest of the EU in young 
people’s voice (i.e., external efficacy) 
Young people’s collective efficacy 










































% female 39.8% 53.3% 40.8% 56.3% 60.2% 64.1% 63.9% 73.5% 62.2% 72.1% 76.4% 67.5% 65.7% 59.5% 





























% citizenship of 
country 
99.1% 91.8% 91.1% 95.2% 98.6% 100% 92.6% 98.5% 82.7% 96.3% 97.4% 97.6% 99.4% 88.1% 
% born in other 
country 
7.5% 8.8% 8.4% 4.5% 1.4% 2.0% 12.0% 7.4% 17.2% 8.0% 6.6% 7.3% 3.0% 15.4% 
% studying at 
school 





1.9% 28.7% 60.5% 1.2% 0.6% 0% 0.7% 7.4% 3.9% 14.0% 3.9% 2.4% 3.5% 2.4% 
% studying at 
(tech) college or 
university 
9.3% 5.4% 5.1% 41.7% 4.2% 54.4% 79.9% 39.7% 79.0% 75.3% 78.9% 73.5% 61.6% 69.0% 
% looking for a 
job 
3.7% 1.0% 7.6% 17.2% 0.8% 2.9% 9.7% 26.5% 3.7% 1.4% 8.2% 12.0% 17.4% 4.8% 
% working full 
time 
0% 6% 4.5% 0% 1.7% 3.9% 0.7% 16.2% 13.6% 4.7% 8.7% 33.7% 4.7% 23.8% 
 


































































































































































































Note. Theoretical range of the answers:1-5. Because of varying sample size per item df ranged between 3451 
and 3127.** = p<0.01, * = p<0-05, ns = p>0.051  



















Engagement with the EU 
Intended 
Voting for the 
2019 EU 
election (%) 


































the EU (%) 
















































Note. Theoretical range of the answers: Non-conventional political participation 0-6; psychological engagement 
with EU issues 0-3; efficacy beliefs 1-5. Because of varying sample size per item df ranged between 3232 and 
3210. ** = p<0.01, * = p<0.05, ns = p>0.051 
  




Prediction of Young People’s Engagement with the EU 
Model R2 Predictors β t, 
Wald 
p 
Intended Voting for the 2019 EU 
Elections 
5.8% Data collected after 
Brexit 0.529 5.634 0.018 
  Gender female 0.514 5.126 0.024 
  Knowledge about 
EU 
0.465 16.526 <0.001 
  Vision Reduction of 
EU 
-0.436 12.807 <0.001 
  Vision Economy 
Challenges 0.680 10.301 <0.001 
  Worry Civil Unrest 
and Collapse of EU 0.462 5.177 0.023 
Non-Conventional Political 
Engagement 
20.5% Data collected after 
Brexit 0.132 6.042 <0.001 
  Age 20-25 years 0.147 7.045 <0.001 
  Knowledge about 
EU 0.334 15.776 <0.001 
  Vision Economic 
Challenges 
-0.109 -4.211 <0.001 
  Worry State 
Surveillance and 
Repression 
0.062 2.416 0.016 
  Worry Disease and 
Violence -0.097 -3.241 <0.001 
Psychological Engagement with 
EU Issues 
20.1% Age 20-25 years 
0.111 5.324 <0.001 
  Knowledge about 
EU 0.305 14.351 <0.001 
  Perceived Interest of 
EU in Young 
People’s Voice 
-0.134 -6.053 <0.001 
  Vision Reduction of 
EU -0.118 -5.009 <0.001 
  Vision Migration 0.109 4.969 <0.001 
  Vision Economic 
Challenges 0.085 3.245 0.001 
  Worry Civil Unrests 
and Collapse of EU 0.083 2.824 0.005 
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  Worry 
Uncontrollable 
Events 
-0.094 -3.126 0.002 
Own Country should leave the 
EU 
16.5% Data collected after 
Brexit 
-0.476 7.589 0.006 
  Gender female -0.523 8.621 0.003 
  Knowledge about 
EU 
0.219 6.402 0.011 
  Perceived Interest of 
EU in Young 
People’s Voice 
-0.373 16.009 <0.001 
  Vision Reduction of 
EU 
0.650 43.935 <0.001 
  Vision Economic 
Challenges 
-0.506 8.057 0.005 
  Vision EU Policy -0.541 26.103 <0.001 
  Worry 
Unemployment and 
Poverty 
0.483 7.286 0.007 
  Worry Civil Unrests 
and Collapse of EU 
-0.909 30.987 <0.001 
  Worry Influx of 
Migrants 
0.414 20.255 <0.001 
Note: Results of the final model including all four blocks. Only significant standardized β coefficients are 
displayed. Dummy variables: Data collected after Brexit (reference group: Data collected before Brexit); Age 
(reference group: 16-19 years); Gender (reference group: males); First generation immigrant (reference group: 
non-immigrant). 
 
